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Constitutional Law-Rummel v. Estelle: Eighth Amendment
Challenge to Length of Prison Sentence
Despite disagreement among legal historians as to whether its position is
justified historically, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the

eighth amendment1 as a prohibition against punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed as well as a prohibition against punishment
that is cruel, inhumane or barbarous in nature. 2 Because of a dearth of cases
and the ambiguity of existing precedent with regard to the proportionality
principle, 3 its scope and meaning are ill-defined. Although the Court has
never invalidated a term of imprisonment on the ground that it violated the
eighth amendment, 4 it was not until the 1979-1980 term that the Court suggested a disproportionate prison sentence is beyond eighth amendment challenge. 5 In Rummel v. Estelle6 the Court rejected a challenge to the
constitutionality of a life sentence imposed upon an habitual offender after
conviction of a third petty property offense. The Rummel Court's holding that
1. The amendment states that "fe]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. This Note
focuses on the portion of the amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments,
. 2. The Court first adopted this position in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See
text accompanying notes 56-66 infra.
The leading proponent of the view that the framers of the amendment intended to incorporate a proportionality principle into the eighth amendment is Anthony F. Granucci. See Granucci, 'Wor Crueland Unusual PunshmnentsInflicted" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV.
839 (1969). Other commentators, however, believe that the founding fathers included the clause
in the Bill of Rights solely to prohibit torture. See, e.g., Mulligan, CruelandUnusualPunlshment:
The ProportionalityRule, 47 FoRDAm L. REv.639 (1979).
3. The Court has been faced with proportionality challenges in a limited number of cases:
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion); Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391 (1916); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 US. 323 (1892). The Court summarily rejected the challenges
made in Badders, Graham and OWeil, and the Court's opinions in Weems and Coker do not state
when the principle applies or how a determination is to be made. See text accompanying notes
56-79 infra.
4. The Court has upheld proportionality challenges in only two cases, Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). In
Weems, the Court held that a sentence mandating a prison term of twelve years at hard labor with
a loss of basic civil liberties upon release was unconstitutional. In Coker, the Court held unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.
At the lower federal and state levels as well, proportionality challenges seldom have been
upheld. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978) (reversing consecutive 20 year
sentences for distribution and possession of marijuana), ajf'd on rehearingen banc, 601 F.2d 153
(4th Cir. 1979), vacatedsub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 100 S.Ct. 1593 (1980); Downey v. Perini, 518
F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.) (reversing 60 year sentence for possession and sale of marijuana), vacatedon
othergrounds,423 U.S. 993 (1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (mandatory life
imprisonment upon third felony conviction constitutionally excessive), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974); Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (48-50 years for safecracking
ruled excessive); Carmona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (life imprisonment for sale
of small amount of cocaine unconstitutional), rev'd, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1091 (1979); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (indeterminate life sentence for second offense of indecent exposure held excessive); People v. Lorentzen, 387
Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972) (20 years for sale of marijuana excessive).
5. See cases cited at note 3 supra.
6. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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sentencing decisions are purely a legislative matter 7 may well mark the end of
constitutional review of legislatively prescribed terms of imprisonment under
the eighth amendment.
The state of Texas convicted petitioner William Rummel in 1964 of the
fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.008 and in 1969 of passing a
forged check in the amount of $28.36. 9 When the state indicted petitioner in
1973 for obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses, the indictment charged him
as an habitual offender on the basis of these two prior convictions.10 The recidivist statute in force in Texas at the time mandated a life sentence upon
conviction of a third felony. Consequently, after a jury convicted Rummel
two prior feloof the false pretenses charge and found that he had committed
12
nies, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment.
After exhausting state remedies,1 3 Rummel filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Texas.' 4 Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Texas habitual offender statute as applied to him because it imposed upon him a sentence
grossly disproportionate to the offenses he had committed.' 5 The district court
appealed to the United
denied the petition without a hearing, and petitioner
6
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.1
While the district court accepted the state's contention that, in light of
Rummel's eligibility for parole, his sentence should be viewed as one for less
than life, 17 a panel of the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention and reversed
7. Id at 274.
8. "It shall be unlawful for any person to present a credit card or alleged credit card

with intent to defraud, to obtain or attempt to obtain any item of value or service of any
type; or to present such credit card or alleged credit card, with the intent to defraud, to
pay for items of value or services rendered."
Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1555b (Vernon 1973) (current version at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit.
7, § 32.31 (Vernon 1974)). The offense constituted a felony because the amount in question was
more than $50.00. See id
9. 445 U.S. at 265. In 1969, the Texas Code provided:
If any person shall knowingly pass as true, or attempt to pass as true, any such forged
instrument in writing as is mentioned and defined in the preceding articles of this chapter, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 996 (Vernon 1961).

10. 445 U.S. at 266.
11. Article 63 of the Texas Penal Code provided in 1973 that "[wlhoever shall have been
three times convicted of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for
life in the penitentiary." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1952). The statute, with minor
modifications, currently is codified at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42 (Vernon 1974).
12. 445 U.S. at 266.
13. The Texas state courts affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and denied his motion for
post-conviction relief. Id at 267.
14. Id
15. Id The United States Supreme Court previously had upheld the constitutionality of the
Texas habitual offender statute in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). The constitutionality of
habitual offender statutes generally has been affirmed by the Court against a variety of challenges.
See, ag., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895). See generally Katkin, HabitualOffender Laws: .4 Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 99, 1113-15 (1971).
16. 445 U.S. at 267.
17. Id
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the decision. 18 In making its determination that Rummers sentence violated
the eighth amendment, the panel relied on the following factors: the nature of
the crimes committed, the legislative purpose of the statute under which the
sentence was imposed, sentences imposed by the state for other crimes, and
sentences imposed upon multiple offenders in other jurisdictions.1 9
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit vacated the panel opinion.20 The
court found that the eighth amendment may prohibit a term of imprisonment
for a minor offense solely because of length,2 1 and it accepted as the appropriate proportionality analysis three of the factors relied on by the panel: the
nature of the offense committed, the sentences imposed by the same jurisdiction for other crimes, and the sentences imposed by other jurisdictions for the
same crime.22 The court, however, refused to consider the types of crimes
underlying Rummel's classification as a recidivist in analyzing the nature of
the offense,23 and it rejected the prong of the test applied by the panel relating
to the legislative purpose of the punishment imposed, finding that "every inference is to be made in favor of the selected punishment." 24 Moreover, the
court viewed Rummel's sentence in the context of parole eligibility as one for
approximately twelve years.25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 26 The Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's finding that the sentence imposed upon Rummel did not violate the
27 but it rejected the tripartite test approved by the Fifth
eighth amendment,
Circuit. 28 The Court found that evidence of the nature of the offense commit30
ted,29 the punishments imposed on multiple offenders by other jurisdictions,
18. 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978).
19. Id at 1197-1200. These factors were first delineated by the United States Court of Ap-

p als for the Fourth Circuit in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,415 U.S.
a83
(1974), to invalidate a life sentence imposed upon a habitual offender in circumstances factual y indistinguishable fromrummel. The Fifth Circuit panel adopted the Hart test after determining that the Fourth Circuit had applied "objective criteria solidly grounded in decisions of the
Supreme Court." 568 F.2d at 1197.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id at 655.
Id at 659-60.
Id at 660-61.
Id at 659.

25. Id at 657-59.
26. 442 U.S. 939 (1979).
27. 445 U.S. at 264.
28. Id at 276-84. The Court's rejection of the test is implicit rather than explicit. See text
accompanying notes 86-89 nfira.
29. Rummel described the offenses underlying his habitual offender status as "petty," pointing to the absence ofviolence and the small amount of money involved. The Court stated that the
absence of violence did not necessarily determine the strength of the societal interest involved in
preventing the crime. Additionally, the Court found that the determination of a crime's severity

by an inquiry into the sum of money involved caused judicial intrusion into the province of the
legislature. Further, the Court noted that in the case before it Rummel received a life sentence for
being an habitual offender. Thus, the Court concluded, the nature of his crimes would be irrelevant in any event 445 U.S. at 274-77.

30. The Court found that a comparison of statutes involved too many factors to allow an
objective determination of whether the Texas statute was the most severe; that, even if the Texas

statute were the most severe, the distinctions between it and the statutes of other jurisdictions were
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and the punishments imposed by the state of Texas for other crimes 3 1 did not
provide a basis for 32an objective determination as to the proportionality of
Rummel's sentence.
Stating that it had never before invalidated a term of imprisonment solely
because of length, the Court distinguished Weems v. United States,33 in which
the Court held a sentence imposed by the Philippine government to be disproportionate because it involved a number of penalties in addition to a lengthy
term of imprisonment. 34 The Court noted that Coker v. Georgia,35 the only
other case in which a sentence had been held unconstitutional on proportionality grounds, also could be distinguished because it involved the death penalty, which is a punishment unique in kind.36 The Court concluded that "one
could argue without. . . contradiction by any decision of this Court that for
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies. . . .the length of the
37
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."
The Court quoted language from Justice White's plurality opinion in
Coker,38 indicating the necessity of objective factors upon which to base an
eighth amendment judgment to avoid substitution of the subjective views of
the individual Justices for that of the legislature,39 and found that, if the punishment challenged differs in kind from a fine or term of imprisonment, an
objective determination can be made. 4° In Coker, for example, the Court
could "draw a 'bright line' " between the death penalty and punishments short
of death. 4 1 Similarly, in Weems, the Court could objectively distinguish between the punishment inflicted and traditional forms of punishment imposed
in the Anglo-Saxon system. 42 The Court reasoned that, in the absence of a
punishment thus distinguishable, the Court could not make an eighth amendthe admonition of Justice White and infringment judgment without violating
43
ing upon the legislative realm.
The establishment of the proportionality principle as a component of the
"subtle and not gross"; and finally, that disparities in sentencing were a natural consequence of
the American system of government. Id at 279-82.
31. In a footnote, the Court stated that any comparison of punishments imposed by the State
of Texas for different offenses would be "inherently speculative." Id at 282 n.27. Although linedrawing admittedly is difficult in most instances, the Court has distinguished, for example, the
crimes of murder and rape. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion).
32. 445 U.S. at 275-84.
33. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
34. 445 U.S. at 273-74.
35. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion).
36. 445 U.S. at 272-73.
37. Id at 274.
38. "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective
views of individual Justices; judgment[s] should be informed by objective factors to the maximum
possible extent." 433 U.S. at 592.
39. 445 U.S. at 274-75.
40. Id at 275.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id at 274-82.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

eighth amendment is a recent development in the history of the amendment. 44
In the earliest cases, before the turn of the century, the Supreme Court interpreted the cruel and unusual punishments clause as a prohibition against punishments that would have been deemed cruel and unusual at the time the
amendment became part of the Constitution. 45 Using this interpretation, the
Court limited the amendment's prohibition to torture and other forms of barbaric treatment and upheld electrocution 4 6 and shooting4 7 as constitutional
this period, the Court held the amendment inmethods of execution. During
48
applicable to the states.
Support for a broader interpretation of the amendment grew, and in
O'Neil v. Vemont 4 9 the dissenters argued that the eighth amendment prohibited more than barbarous or inhumane forms of punishment. 50 The State of
Vermont convicted O'Neil of selling liquor without authorization and, in accordance with state law which made every act of selling an offense, found him
guilty of 307 separate offenses. 5 ' The state ordered O'Neil to pay $6140 or
serve 19,914 days at hard labor.52 The majority rejected O'Neil's claim of
cruel and unusual punishment on the grounds that the issue had not been
raised on appeal as it had in the lower courts and that the amendment did not
apply to the states.53 Justice Field, followed by Justices Harlan and Brewer,
dissented and found that the eighth amendment prohibited punishments that,
54
in severity or excessive length, were disproportionate to the offenses charged.
Justice Field compared the penalty imposed on O'Neil with the penalties imposed for manslaughter, perjury, and forgery, and found that the state had
levied a penalty against O'Neil that constituted cruel and unusual punish55
ment.
In Weems v. UnitedStates,56 the Court adopted the view expressed in the
O'Neii dissent. The Philippine government convicted Weems of falsifying a
public document and sentenced him to fifteen years of hard labor with chains
at his ankles and wrists. 5 7 Moreover, the sentence required that after his release he be kept under constant surveillance and that he relinquish many of
44. In the 1970s the Court heard a series of challenges to the constitutionality of the death
penalty. Although the challenges, with the exception of Coker, were not based on the proportionality principle, the Court repeatedly recognized that the cruel and unusual punishments clause
prohibited punishment excessive in amount as well as in kind. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 458 (1972)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
45. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
46. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
47. 99 U.S. 130 (1879).

48. See Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866).
49. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).

50. Id at 337-40 (Field, J., dissenting).
51. Id at 327.
52. Id at 330.
53. Id at 331-32.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id at 339 (Field, J., dissenting); Id at 371 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id at 339 (Field, J., dissenting).
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id at 357-58, 364.
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his rights as a citizen of the Philippines. 58 Weems charged that this sentence
violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause in the Philippine Bill of
Rights.5 9 Because the Philippine cruel and unusual punishments clause had
been derived from the eighth amendment, the Court found that the clause in
the Philippine Bill of Rights had the same meaning as the clause contained in
the eighth amendment. 60 The Court examined the nature of the offense committed by Weems 6 1 and compared the punishment imposed upon him with the
punishment imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense 62 and in the
same jurisdiction for more serious crimes. 63 The Court concluded that the
Philippine government had imposed upon Weems a punishment so grossly
disproportionate to the offense committed that it violated the eighth amendment. 64 Weems established that the eighth amendment prohibits punishment
that is excessive, either in nature or amount,65 and that the contemporary values of society66are the standard by which the constitutionality of a punishment
is measured.
The proportionality principle recognized in Weems is rarely applied, 67
and the cases in which proportionality is at issue seldom reach the Court.68
Soon after it decided Weems and prior to its application of the eighth amendment to the states, the Court faced several proportionality challenges, but it
rejected each claim summarily. In Graham v. West Virginia 69 the Court found
meritless a claim that a life sentence imposed upon an habitual offender, who
had been convicted three times of horse theft, violated the eighth amendment.70 Similarly, in Badders v. United States,7 1 the Court rejected a challenge to a sentence imposed as a result of a conviction of multiple violations of
58. The punishment deprived Weems of the rights of parental authority, guardianship of

person and property, administration of property and inter vivos disposition of property. Moreover, he could not hold office. Id at 364.
59. Id at 359.
60. Id at 367-68.
61. The Court found that the offense required merely the entry of a false notation on a public
document; intent was not required. Id at 363.
62. Id at 381.
63. The Court compared the sentence prescribed for falsification of a document with those
imposed for treason, forgery, robbery, and larceny. Id at 380.
64. Id at 381.
65. In interpreting the eighth amendment it will be regarded as a "precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." Id at 367.
66. "The clause of the Constitution. . . may be. . . progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."
Id at 378.
67. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
68. Id
69. 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
70. The facts in Graham are almost identical to the facts in Rummel, and the Court in Rummel cites Graham as authority for its conclusion that Texas constitutionally could sentence Rummel to life imprisonment. Graham, however, is of dubious significance. Graham challenged a
state law prior to the Court's incorporation of the eighth amendment into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, and the Court gave no explanation for its rejection of Graham's claim.
See 445 U.S. at 290-91 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
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a mail fraud statute.72 The Court stated that Congress has the authority to
make each deposit of a letter in violation of the statute a separate offense and
for each of those separate offenses
that, as a consequence, a sentence imposed
73
did not violate the eighth amendment.
Since Weems, the Court has not invalidated a noncapital punishment as
disproportionate to the underlying offense. 74 In fact, after Badders the Court
did not again entertain a proportionality claim 75 until it held in Coker v. Georgia76 that imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape violated the
eighth amendment. The Court decided that case after the eighth amendment
was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 77 The
Court reiterated its statement in Weems that the eighth amendment prohibits
excessive punishment but cautioned that a determination that a punishment is
unconstitutional must be based on objective factors. 78 The Court found
Coker's death sentence grossly disproportionate to his crime on the basis of the
inflicted in other jurisdictions for rape,
severity of the offense, the punishments
79
and the harm to the victim.
In Rummel the Court examined its prior eighth amendment decisions and
determined that decisions as to length of imprisonment are to be left to the
legislative branch.8 0 Although none of the precedents state explicitly that the
proportionality principle is applicable to terms of imprisonment, none supports the Rummel position either 8 1 In cases dealing with eighth amendment
challenges, the Court has repeatedly stated, without qualification, that the
cruel and unusual punishments clause prohibits excessive punishment.82 The
Court has rejected proportionality challenges to terms of imprisonment,8 3 but
the Court has never indicated that it based these decisions on the broad8 4proposition that the eighth amendment is inapplicable to prison sentences.
The Rummel Court's explanation of Coker and Weems,85 however, made
its decision inevitable. The Court distinguished the type of punishment chal72. As Powell noted in his dissent in Rummel, Badders "merely teaches that the Court did
not believe that a five-year sentence for the commission of seven crimes was cruel and unusual."
445 U.S. at 290-91 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. 240 U.S. at 393.
74. See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 644.
75. The Court, however, did make a number of eighth amendment determinations. In Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), for example, the Court found unconstitutional the punishment of
expatriation imposed for wartime desertion from the armed forces. The Court in Trop reiterated
the progressive nature of the eighth amendment: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id at 101.
76. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion).
77. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
78. 433 U.S. at 592.
79. Id
80. 445 U.S. at 274.
81. See text accompanying notes 67-79 supra.
82. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
83. See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. at 631; Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. at 392.

See also text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
84. See notes 70 & 72 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 34-43 supra.
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lenged by Rummel from the punishments deemed unconstitutional in Coker
and Weems, 8 6 and implied that its decision in both cases could be justified
solely on the basis of the "objective" distinction made by the Court between
fines and imprisonment, and other types of punishment such as the death penalty.8 7 The Court reasoned that the principle of judicial restraint requires an
objective determination to be made" and found that the distinction possible
in Coker and Weems is the only "objective" factor upon which a determination of disproportionality can be made.8 9 Because the punishment challenged
by Rummel could not be "objectively" distinguished from the punishments
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense, the principle of judicial
restraint precluded constitutional review.
The Rummel opinion violates precedent in three respects. First, by excluding comparison of a challenged punishment with punishments imposed by
other jurisdictions for the same crime, the Court ignores its own admonitions
that the eighth amendment is "progressive" 90 and that the amendment must
be interpreted in light of contemporary values. 9 1 Comparison of punishments
among jurisdictions is an indispensable barometer of these values. Second,
despite the consideration of the nature of the defendant's offenses in Coker
and Weems, the Court refused to examine this factor to determine the proportionality of Rummel's sentence. 92 The Court's use of the factor in Coker implies that, prior to Rummel, the Court viewed the nature of the offense as a
relevant and objective factor to be considered in determining whether a punishment is so disproportionate as to violate the eighth amendment.
Third, the court erred in concluding that Coker and Weems proscribed
review of Rummel's sentence. 93 The Court ignored the fundamental principle
that the desirability of judicial restraint must be balanced against the need for
constitutional review.94 In Coker and Weems the Court discussed the tension
between the two goals 95 and concluded that, in the cases before it, the severity
of the punishments warranted judicial intervention. 96 The Court in both cases
recognized that the eighth amendment limits legislative discretion and that the
Court has an obligation to ensure that these limits are delineated and ob86. 445 U.S. at 272-75.
87. See id at 283 n.27.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See text accompanying notes 41-43.
445 U.S. at 274-75.
See, eg., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 378.
See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
442 U.S. at 276.

93. See text accompanying notes 56-66 & 76-79 supra.
94. See generally C. WRIoHT,HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 218-29 (3d
ed. 1976).
95. In Weems, for example, the Court stated "There is a certain subordination of the judiciary to the legislature. The function of the legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by presump-

tions of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of
their wisdom or propriety. They have no limitation... but constitutional ones, and what those
are the judiciary must judge." 217 U.S. at 379.
96. 433 U.S. at 592; 217 U.S. at 381.
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served. 97 However, the Rummel holding that the principle ofjudicial restraint
prohibits constitutional review of a term of imprisonment precluded consideration of the real issue: whether the eighth amendment requires judicial modification of prison sentences that are disproportionately severe relative to the
gravity of the underlying offense. The Court, in effect, has held that the inherent difficulty in defining "proportionality" justifies erasing the concept from
the eighth amendment, irrespective of any constitutional imperatives to the
contrary.
Despite the Court's avoidance of the crucial issue in Rummel, the opinion
removes terms of imprisonment from eighth amendment scrutiny. As a long
accepted method of punishment, imprisonment is not subject to challenge as
an excessive form of punishment, and the Court, by rejecting as subjective the
factors previously used in proportionality analysis, makes it impossible to
prove that a particular prison sentence is so excessive in length as to constitute
an eighth amendment violation. In a society that imposes only three increasingly severe forms of punishment-fines, imprisonment and death-the result
is to remove legislatively imposed punishment, with the exception of capital
punishment, from judicial scrutiny. This limitation of the scope of the eighth
amendment is contrary to the concept of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause as a measure of "the progress of a maturing society,"9 8 and, in time, this

limited reading of the amendment may render it a nullity.
LINDA S. LEONARD

97. See, eg., note 95 supra.
98. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

